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Ce papier étudie une classe de jeu de Cournot à deux étapes, où dans
une première étape, des firmes rivales manipulent leurs coûts marginaux de
production en supportant des coûts de manipulation, de manière à pouvoir choisir
le type de jeu qu'elles veulent jouer en deuxième étape. Les coûts marginaux sont
manipulés en redistribuant les actifs productifs, ou en choisissant leur localisation,
ou en créant des marchés internes d'inputs. Une formulation générale de ce type de
jeu, dit « jeux de manipulation des coûts avec coût à manipuler », est fournie, et
plusieurs applications du modèle sont analysées. Nous montrons que souvent
l'allocation optimale des ressources au sein d'un oligopole à la Cournot peut être
asymétrique, même dans le cas ou les firmes sont symétriques ex-ante. Nous
caractérisons le degré d'asymétrie en fournissant la solution globale d'un programme
convexe (ou concave). Notre approche est assez générale pour pouvoir être
appliquée aux jeux de Bertrand avec produits différenciés, aux jeux de localisation
avec coût de transport (les modèles de Hotelling et de Salop) et aux jeux de
Stackelberg.
This paper analyzes a class of two-stage Cournot games where rival
firms, in the first stage, incur real resource costs in jointly manipulating their
marginal costs of production, so as to influence the outcome of game they want to
play in the second stage. Marginal costs may be manipulated by various means,
such as redistribution of productive assets, or choice of location, or by creating an
internal market for inputs. A general formulation of the game is provided, and
several applications of the model are analyzed. We show that often the optimal
allocation of resources within a Cournot oligopoly can be asymmetric, even when
firms are ex ante symmetric, and we characterize the degree of asymmetry by
finding a global solution to a convex (or concave) program. Our formulation of
cost manipulation games with cost of manipulating is general enough to apply to
Bertrand games with differentiated products, games involving location and
transport costs (the Hotelling and Salop models), and Stackelberg games.
Mots Clés : Oligopole, jeux de Cournot, manipulation des coûts
Keywords : Oligopoly, Cournot games, cost manipulation
JEL : L13, L23
1 Introduction
Firms in an oligopoly are not always in an adversarial relationship. In a
recent book entitled \Co-opetition," Nalebu and Brandenburger (1996)
describe many real world situations of alliances between rival rms. They
develop the theme that rms may modify the rules of their games in or-
der to achieve partial cooperation while remaining rivals in the nal good
market
1
. Their insightful discussion is an invitation for economists to
develop a unifying framework for the analysis of a class of games in which
rival rms have the ability, in an earlier stage of the game, to determine
the set of actions or outcomes that are admissible in the subsequent sub-
games. An interesting example of two-stage games that involve coopera-
tion at one level and rivalry at another level is the creation of competing
divisions within a multi-divisional rm. Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996)
analyze \strategic incentives to divide production among autonomous
competing units through divisionalization, franchising, or divestiture".
A related phenomenon is the establishment of an internal input market
within an oligopoly, of which the intrarm resource ows and knowl-
egde ows constitute a special case. It may be argued that these ows
are created partly to inuence the outcome of rivalry in a second stage
of a game. Trade between parent rms and their foreign aliates that
are potential rivals (e.g. Sony products made in Malaysia versus almost
identical Sony products made in China) may be analyzed in terms of a
two-stage game. The importance of intrarm resource ows is well doc-
umented in the World Investment Report (1993). In manufacturing, the
share of intrarm transactions in foreign sales by US foreign aliates
rose from 30 per cent to 36 per cent over the period 1977-89. Data for
the US on royalties and licence fees indicate that more than 70 per cent
of all receipts and 50 per cent of all payments were intra-transnational
corporation transactions (World Investment Report, 1993, p.164.).
Another example of two-stage games is the formation of a production
joint venture (denoted as PJV, as distinct from research joint venture,
RJV) by rival rms
2
. Many production joint ventures have the features
that participants that use the joint venture's output as their intermediate
inputs are rivals in the nal good market. Gale (1994) cites as exam-
ples (i) rms sharing natural gas pipelines, (ii) an aluminium rolling mill
jointly owned by Alcan and Arco. Participants cooperate in the alloca-
1
The semi-collusion aspect of oligopoly has been emphasized by Friedman and
Thisse (1993), and Fershtman and Gandal (1994).
2
See Spencer and Raubitschek (1996), Gale (1994) for models of PJVs, and
d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Suzumura (1992), Kamien et al. (1992) for
RJVs.
1
tion of the output of the PJV to them, who act as rivals in a diferent
stage of the game.
3
In this paper we provide a general methodology for analyzing a class
of two-stage games among oligopolists, and illustrate the usefulness of
our approach by considering a number of applications. We are concerned
with \games of cost manipulation in the presence of costs of manipula-
tion". The costs of manipulating costs play an important role. These
costs may be in the form of internal production of an essential input, ca-
pacity choice, or choice of the rm's locatio, etc. We seek to characterize
the solution of this type of games in terms of the concavity or convex-
ity of the overall objective function in the rst stage. Our resolution
is geometric in nature. We show that the stage one objective function
may display, under quite general assumptions, a fundamental convexity
in the choice variables.
A major common thread in the applications that we focus on is the
following broad issue: why do internal markets for certain crucial inputs
emerge within an oligopoly? It will be seen that a large organization con-
sisting of independent rival units may have an incentive to generate an
internal input market as a means of fostering collusion.While we analyse
only a few examples, it will become clear that our framework is suitable
for the analysis of various aspects of behavior of multi-divisional rms,
multi-national rms, production joint ventures, and so on. In addition to
providing a general framework of analysis, we also obtain some specic
results. Among these is the result that, contrary to the general presump-
tion that ex-ante symmetric rms will choose to be ex-post symmetric in
their joint prot maximization decisions, it is quite often the case that
the solution of the above class of games is asymmetric, even if rms are
ex-ante symmetric. The intuition behind this result is as follows. In a
Cournot oligopoly
4
, with a xed number of rms each having a constant
marginal cost, the equilibrium industry output in stage 2 depends only
on the sum of their marginal costs (see Bergstrom and Varian (1985a));
it follows that if this sum is kept constant, while some rms' marginal
costs are made to increase and other rms'marginal costs are made to
decrease, then industry output, price, and total revenue will remain un-
3
Two-stage games of a similar nature, with or without collusion or government
intervention in the rst stage, include learning-by-doing by oligopolists (rst period
output levels have an inuence on second period cost; see Fudenberg and Tirole
(1983), Krouse (1994) for example); technology choice (investment decision concern-
ing equipment types in period one determines the level of constant marginal cost in
period two; see DeGraba (1990), and Newbery (1990, especially pp.344-345).
4
More generally, a modied version of his result applies also to Bertrand games,
Stackelberg games, and games involving location such as the Hotelling and Salop
models.
2
changed, and therefore industry prot will rise because the same total
output is now produced at lower cost (as rms with decreased marginal
costs will expand their market shares at the expense of rms with in-
creased marginal costs). This is the eciency motive for cost manipula-
tion. In the context of a simple model of research joint venture without
the cost of manipulating costs, this result has been formalized by Long
and Soubeyran
5
(1995a): industry prot is an increasing function of the
variance of the distribution of the constant marginal costs. In this pa-
per, we deal with the issue of manipulation of marginal costs in a much
more general fashion, by (i) introducing real resource costs of manipu-
lating costs, (ii) providing a global characterization of the solution, and
(iii) dealing with both the cases of constant marginal costs and rising
marginal costs. Our approach relies on the decomposition principle (see
Rockafellar, 1970, Section 28, or Luenberger 1969, Ch. 8).
It is clear from the above discussion that asymmetric solution to a
symmetric problem arises when there is lack of concavity in the objective
function. By deriving the properties of the equilibrium prot function
for oligopoly, our model explains a key source of this lack of concavity.
But we should point out that there are situations where the cost of
manipulation of costs has a high degree of convexity, so that the objective
function becomes concave, giving rise to the optimality of symmetric
solutions. Both cases are discussed in Section 2, where we also treat the
more realistic case where rms are ex-ante asymmetric.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the gen-
eral methodology and some general results, under the assumption that
marginal costs are independent of the scale of output. Section 3 ex-
tends the results to the case of multiplicatively separable scale-dependent
marginal costs. In Section 4 we illustrate the use of our general method
on some specic applications. Section 5 and the Appendix oers some
5
A closely related result was proved by Bergstrom and Varian (1985b). They
assume that rms have identical constant marginal costs, but face dierent tax rates,
and show that tax revenue is a decreasing function of the variance of the tax rates.
At a less formal level, several authors have provided numerical examples where an
increase in the dispersion of (constant) marginal costs in a duopoly will increase
the sum of their prots. See Newbery (1990, pp. 344-345) and Salant and Shaer
(1992). Neither paper gave a formula relating industry prot to the variance of
the distribution of marginal costs and both papers assumed linear demand. While
working on the present paper, we received a paper by Salant and Shaer (1996)
addressing the same topic. The latter paper gives sucient conditions for a solution to
be asymmetric, in terms of gains achieved by a marginal deviation from a symmetric
point. Our approach is dierent: we provide a global resolution of a convex or concave
problem, and characterize fully the degree of asymmetry. The question concerning
the (integer) number of rms achieving dierent levels of cost reduction in the optimal
solution is also answered.
3
further extensions.
2 The Model
We consider an oligopoly consisting of m rms that produce a homoge-
nous good. Let M  f1; 2; :::;mg: Let q
i
denote rm i's output, i 2M .
The inverse demand function is
P = P (Q); P
0
(Q) < 0
where Q =
P
i2M
q
i
. (Generalization to the case where P = P (Q+Q

)
where Q

is the output of another set of rms, possibly located some-
where else, can be easily achieved at a small cost, in terms of additional
notation.) Assume that rm i's current marginal cost of production is
independent of its current output level q
i
but is dependent on the level of
a choice variable made in an earlier stage, such as the rm's investment
in capital equipment, or the amount of entrepreneurial time committed
to monitoring, or accumulated experience, or the result of R&D in previ-
ous periods. For simplicity, we represent this variable by a non-negative
real number e
i
. We capture the cost-saving eect of e
i
by postulating
that the marginal cost of output is decreasing in e
i
:
c
i
(e
i
) = c
i
  r
i
(e
i
); r
i
(0) = 0; r
0
i
(e
i
)  0 (1)
where r
i
(:) is the reduction in marginal cost.
In some applications, the cost reduction achieved by one rm may
depend not only on its choice variable (such as its nominal R&D ex-
penditure) but also on the activity of other rms (eg. their nominal
R&D expenditures) because of spillover eects. In such cases, our for-
mulation (1) need to be re-interpreted; for example, in the presence of
R&D spillovers, e
i
would then represents rm i 's eective R&D, which
is a variable that takes into account the spillover eects.(See Long and
Soubeyran (1995b).)
The class of two-stage Cournot games considered in this paper has
the following main charateristic: in the rst stage, the variables e
i
are
either collusively determined, or are independently chosen by the rms
under the direct inuence of a dominant actor (as in the case of a govern-
ment agency that allocates rm-specic R&D subsidies, or that imposes
rm-specic pollution standards). This determines each rm's constant
marginal cost in stage two, when the rms are Cournot rivals. In the
case of collusive behavior in stage one, the objective is to maximize
joint prots. In the case of a dominant actor, the objective may be to
4
maximize some social welfare function if the dominant actor is a govern-
ment agency. Regardless of the specic formulation of the problem in
stage one, a necessary step in understanding the game is to analyze the
Cournot equilibrium in stage two. We now turn to this task.
2.1 Analysis of Cournot equilibrium in stage two
At the beginning of stage two, the variables e
i
have been chosen. Firm i's
marginal cost is then c
i
(e
i
); which we denote in this subsection by c
i
for
short. We assume that for each i the feasible range of e
i
is [0; e
max
i
]. This
means c
i
is restricted in the range [c
min
i
; c
i
], where c
min
i
 c
i
  r
i
(e
max
i
).
Firms compete in quantities. At a Cournot equilibrium, outputs are
determined by the following conditions:
@
i
@q
i
= P
0
(
b
Q)bq
i
+ P (
b
Q)  c
i
 0 (2)
bq
i
 0; bq
i
@
i
@q
i
= 0 (3)
In addition, if bq
i
> 0; then the following second order condition must
hold: P
00
(
b
Q)bq
i
+ 2P
0
(
b
Q)  0: This condition may be expressed as
2  s
i
E  0 (4)
where E   P
00
(
b
Q)
b
Q=P
0
(
b
Q) is the elasticity of the slope of the demand
curve and s
i
 bq
i
=
b
Q is rm i's market share.
Assumption S: The second order condition (4) is satised.
We will consider only situations where the values of (c
1
; :::; c
m
) are
such that all rms produce in equilibrium, and where for each vector
(c
1
; :::; c
m
) there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium. (Sucient condi-
tions for the existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibria are given by
Nishimura and Friedman (1981), Kolstad and Mathieson (1989), Gaudet
and Salant (1991), Long and Soubeyran (1999.) Under the assumption
that (2) holds with equality for all rms, the sum of these m equations
yields
P
0
(
b
Q)
b
Q+mP (
b
Q) =
X
i2M
c
i
 C (5)
where C is the sum of the marginal costs. Note that C is restricted in the
range [C
min
; C
max
] where C
min

P
i2M
c
min
i
and C
max

P
i2M
c
i
. As
pointed out by Bergstrom and Varian (1985a), equation (5) shows that
equilibrium industry output depends only on the sum of the marginal
5
costs. To ensure uniqueness and interiority of the solution, additional
assumptions are imposed below.
Given m, we dene the function
 (Q) = P
0
(Q)Q+mP (Q);  (0) = mP (0) > 0
Clearly, if  (Q) is a decreasing function for all Q > 0 and if there
exists some Q
#
> 0 such that  (Q) < 0 for all Q greater than Q
#
,
then (5) has a unique solution
b
Q =
b
Q(C) for each C in the interval
0  C  mP (0). The condition that  (Q) is decreasing can be expressed
as P
00
(Q)Q+ (m+ 1)P
0
(Q) < 0, or equivalently as
E < m+ 1 (6)
where E is the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve. Condition
(6) is also a familiar stability condition for Cournot equilibria (see Dixit
(1986), for example). Finally, the assumption that the equilibrium out-
put q
i
is positive for all rms is justied if P (Q(C)) > c
i
: (If the demand
function is P = A BQ, a sucient condition for this is A > (m+1)c
i
:)
It is useful to state our assumptions more formally:
Assumption E: There exists some positive Q
#
such that  (Q
#
),
 (Q) < 0 for all Q greater than Q
#
, and for all output level Q < Q
#
,
the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve is less than m+ 1:
Assumption I: For all C in the range [C
min
; C
max
], c
i
< P (
b
Q(C))
for all i:
Assumption I ensures that all rms produces in equilibrium. We are
now ready to state a few important lemmas, the rst one being a simple
re-statement of a result stated in Bergstrom-Varian (1985a).
6
Lemma 1:Under assumptions S, E and I, the equilibrium industry
output
b
Q is uniquely determined by C and is independent of the distri-
bution of marginal costs among the oligopolists.
Having determined the function
b
Q(C), we can now express the equi-
librium output of rm i , and its equilibrium prot, as a function of only
two parameters, C and c
i
.
Lemma 2:Under Assumptions S, E and I, rm i's equilibrium output
is
bq
i
=
P (
b
Q(C))   c
i
[ P
0
(
b
Q(C))]
 bq
i
(c
i
; C) (7)
6
Bergstrom and Varian (1985a,b) noted that several authors had been aware of
this result.
6
and its equilibrium prot is given by

i
=
h
P (
b
Q(C))   c
i
i
bq
i
=
h
P (
b
Q(C))  c
i
i
2
[ P
0
(
b
Q(C))]
 
i
(c
i;
C) (8)
We now turn to industry prot in a Cournot equilibrium. Using
Lemma 2, it is easy to arrive at the following result:
Proposition 1( The Industry Equilibrium Prot Function):
Average industry prot in a Cournot equilibrium, under Assumptions
S, E and I, is a linear and increasing function of the variance of the
distribution of marginal costs accross rms:

M
=
X
i2M

i
(c
i
; C)
m
=
V
M
(c; C) + [P (
b
Q(C))   (C=m)]
2
[ P
0
(
b
Q(C))]
 
M
(c; C)
(9)
where c  (c
1
; :::; c
m
) is the vector of marginal costs and V
M
(c; C) is the
variance of their distribution:
V
M
(c; C) 
1
m
X
i2M
[c
i
  (C=m)]
2

1
m
X
i2M
[c
i
  c
M
]
2
(10)
Proof: Summing (8) over all rms to obtain
[ P
0
]m
M
=
X
i2M
h
b
P   c
M

+ (c
M
  c
i
)
i
2
=
X
i2M
(c
M
  c
i
)
2
+
X
i2M
(
b
P   c
M
)
2
(11)
Remark: The second term in the numerator of (9) is the square of
the average mark-up.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follow. Take the simplest
case where the industry consists of two identical rms. Now let rm
1's constant marginal cost be shifted upward by  and that of rm 2 be
shifted downward by  . The two reaction functions will then be shifted,
one outwards and the other inwards, in a compensating fashion, and
hence the industry equilibrium output will remain unchanged. Hence
the equilibrium price and industry revenue are unaected. On the other
hand, industry production cost will be lower than before, because more
than half of industry output will be produced by the lower cost rm. It
follows that industry prot will be greater than before.
7
The above argument shows that the Cournot oligopolists have an in-
centive to aect a change in the distribution of marginal costs among
rms as the gainers can more than compensate the losers, if such re-
distribution does not use up any signicant amount of real resources
and does not violate anti-trust laws. In what follows, we deal with the
more general case where the manipulation of marginal costs involves real
resource costs.
The next result links average industry prot to the Herndahl index
of industry concentration:
Corollary 1:(Link between Industry Prot and the Hernd-
ahl Index) Given the marginal cost sum C, the equilibrium industry
prot is an increasing function of the Herndahl index of concentration.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Next, consider social welfare, dened as the sum of consumers' sur-
plus and producers' surplus. Consumers' surplus is
S(
b
Q) 
Z
b
Q
0
P (
~
Q)d
~
Q 
b
QP (
b
Q)
Since
b
Q =
b
Q(C) in a Cournot equilibrium, social welfare is
W (c; C)  S(
b
Q(C)) +m
M
(c; C) (12)
From (12) and Corollary 1, we obtain the following result:
Corollary 2: For a given sum C of marginal costs, an increase in
the Herndahl index, made possible by increasing the dispersion of the
distribution of marginal costs, will improve both industry prot and
social welfare.
2.2 Analysis of Stage 1: Manipulation of Marginal
Costs
We now turn to Stage 1. This stage is characterized by some sort of
collusive behavior. In the most obvious applications, the rival rms
collude by reallocating resources among themselves so that for any given
marginal cost sum C they maximize their joint prots. The problem
would be trivial if rms can costlessly \redistribute" their marginal costs,
8
in the sense that one rm's marginal cost could be reduced by  as long
as another rm's marginal cost is increased by . We deal with the more
realistic case where redistribution of marginal costs involves real costs,
which may be called \cost of manipulating costs".
It is convenient to invert the cost reduction function r
i
(e
i
) to obtain
e
i
= e
i
(r
i
) ; where r
i
is restricted to be in the interval [0; r
max
i
]. With
a slight abuse of notation, we express the dependence of equilibrium
output on C in an alternative form:
b
Q =
b
Q(r
M
) (13)
where
r
M

1
m
X
i2M
r
i
(14)
The direct cost to rm i for taking action e
i
will be denoted by 
i
(e
i
).
Then rm i's net prot is

net
i

h
P (
b
Q(r
M
))  c
i
+ r
i
i
2
[ P
0
(
b
Q(r
M
))]
  
i
(e
i
(r
i
)) (15)
The objective function for the problem in stage one is to maximize net
joint prots
m
net
M

1
[ P
0
(
b
Q(r
M
))]
X
i2M
h
P (
b
Q(r
M
))  c
i
+ r
i
i
2
 
X
i2M

i
(e
i
(r
i
))
(16)
subject to 0  r
i
 r
max
i
:
To facilitate an intuitive comprehension of the nature of this problem,
and particularly, to sharpen the focus on the crucial issue of asymmetric
versus symmetric solutions, it is helpful to decompose the problem (16)
into two subproblems. First, for a given r
M
; how should the r
i
's be
chosen? The second subproblem is the choice of the optimal r
M
. It is the
rst subproblem that commands our attention here, because the question
of optimality of asymmetric allocation when rms are ex-ante symmetric
is not well understood. The separation of the two subproblems has the
avor of the traditional separation of income and substitution eects in
the theory of the consumer, or the separation of cost minimization from
prot maximization in the theory of the rm.
To summarize, in the rst subproblem, we take a given r
M
and seek
to maximize 
M
by choosing a non-negative vector of cost reductions r
9
belonging to a feasible set G(r
M
) dened by
G(r
M
)  f(r
1
; :::; r
m
) : 0  r
i
 r
max
i
;
m
X
i=1
r
i
= mr
M
g (17)
The solution of this subproblem
7
yields r
i
= r
i
(r
M
). In the second sub-
problem, the optimum r
M
is determined. The main merit of this two-step
procedure is that when we x r
M
we eectively x the Cournot equilib-
rium price and thus we are able to separate the revenue considerations,
as represented by the term P (Q(r
M
))Q , from the cost minimization
considerations (the allocation of cost reductions among rms, holding
r
M
constant, and the tradeo between, on the one hand, the eciency
gain resulting from this allocation, and on the other hand, the costs
of manipulating costs, as represented by the change in the sum of the

i
(e
i
)'s). In what follows we will analyze the rst subproblem only, and
the the second subproblem will be dealt with in Appendix 2.
Let us dene the vector x  (x
1;
:::; x
m
) where
x
i
 c
i
  P (
b
Q(r
M
)) (18)
(One may interpret  x
i
= P  c
i
 m
i
as the prot margin, net of r
i
).
Then given r
M
the objective function (16) becomes:
max
r
 (r) 
1
[ P
0
(
b
Q(r
M
))]
k r  x k
2
 
m
X
i=1

i
(e
i
(r
i
)) (19)
where k r  x k
2
 v(r) is the square of the Euclidean distance between
the vector r (to be chosen from the set G(r
M
)) and the xed vector x.
Let
(r) 
m
X
i=1

i
(e
i
(r
i
)) (20)
If (:) = 0 identically then the problem (19) is simply one of nding
a point r in the set G(r
M
) that is of maximal distance from the given
point x. Since v(r) is a strictly convex function, and G(r
M
) is a convex
set dened by linear inequalities, the solution must occur at a corner of
the feasible set G(r
M
).
In general (:) is not zero. We will focus on three cases. In the rst
two cases, we assume that all rms are ex-ante identical, so that for all
i in f1; 2; :::;mg, c
i
= c; r
max
i
= r
max
; etc., while in the third case, we
7
It can be shown that all q
i
are positive when the r
i
's are between 0 and r
max
.
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allow rms to be ex-ante asymmetric, but the function (:) is strictly
concave.
Case 1 (Ex ante identical rms, strictly concave objective
function): (:) is suciently convex in r such that  (r) is strictly
concave in r despite the convexity of v(r).
Case 2 (Ex ante identical rms, strictly convex objective
function): (:) is concave or linear (or only mildly convex) in r; so that
 (r) is strictly convex in r.
Case 3 (Ex ante asymmetric rms, strictly concave objective
function)
Clearly, in Case 1, for any given r
M
2 [0; r
max
] the solution is
r
1
= r
2
= ::: = r
m
= r
M
(21)
This follows from the fact that  (:) is symmetric and strictly concave
in (r
1
; :::; r
m
).
In Case 2, we consider two subcases.
Subcase (2a): mr
M
< r
max
Subcase (2b): mr
M
 r
max
Without loss of generality, we adopt the convention that whenever
there is an asymmetric solution -that is, r
i
6= r
j
, for some pair (i; j)- we
will describe it in the form r
1
 r
2
 r
3
 :::  r
m
. We now state our
results For both cases:
Proposition 4: Assume that rms are ex-ante identical.
(i) If the objective function  (r) is strictly convex (i.e., case 2), then
 Under Subcase (2a), the solution is
r
1
= mr
M
< r
max
; r
2
= r
3
= ::: = r
m
= 0
 Under Subcase (2b), let m
0
denote the greatest positive integer
that belongs to the setK(r
M
) of all positive integers k that satises
the inequality kr
max
 mr
M
. The solution is: if m
0
r
max
= mr
M
,
then
r
1
= r
2
= ::: = r
m
0
= r
max
; r
j
= 0; j  m
0
+ 1
and if m
0
r
max
< mr
M
, then
r
1
= r
2
= ::: = r
m
0
= r
max
; r
m
0
+1
= r
+
< r
max
;
r
j
= 0; j  m
0
+ 2
where r
+
 mr
M
 m
0
r
max
> 0.
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(ii) If the objective function  (r) is strictly concave, i.e., Case 1, then
the solution is symmetric, as given by (21).
(iii) If  (r) is neither concave nor convex, then it is possible to have two
or more levels of cost reductions that are in the interior of the set G(r
M
).
Remark: Proposition 4 tells us that, given that rms are ex-ante iden-
tical, in the strictly convex case, the solution is asymmetric in a simple
way: there are at most three types of rms, with one bunch at the
top (achieving the maximum possible cost reduction), one bunch at the
bottom (achieving no reduction in cost) and at most a single rm that
achieves an intermediate level of cost reduction, r
+
.
We now outline the proof of part (i) of Proposition 4. Part (ii) is
obvious, and for part (iii) the reader is referred to the example in Long
and Soubeyran (1995b) in the context of research joint ventures.
Proof: From (19), and (17) we form the Lagrangian
L =  (r) + 
"
mr
M
 
X
i2M
r
i
#
+
X
i2M

i
r
i
+
X
i2M

i
[r
max
  r
i
] (22)
where  (r) may be expanded as follows
 (r) 
1
[ 
c
P
0
]
X
i2M
[r
i
  r
M
]
2
+
m
h
b
P   c+ r
M
i
2
[ 
c
P
0
]
 
X
i2M

i
(e
i
(r
i
)) (23)
First, we must prove that it is not possible to have a solution with
more than one rm achieving intermediate level of cost reductions. We
oer a proof by contradiction. Thus, suppose at the solution point there
are two rms, say i and j, with 0 < r
i
< r
max
, and 0 < r
j
< r
max
. Then
for h = i; j
2(r
h
  r
M
)
[ 
c
P
0
]
 
@
h
@r
h
= ; h = i; j (24)
Since the left-hand side of (24) is increasing in r
h
(due to the assumption
that  (:) is convex), it follows that r
i
= r
j
= r

, say. But then a small
departure from this common value r

by adding  to r
i
and substracting
 from r
j
will improves the value of  (r) as given in (23). In particular,
note that the rst term on the right hand side of (23) is the familiar vari-
ance expression, which will increase with such a departure. At the same
time, the \cost of manipulating costs term", the third term, being the
sum of m identical concave functions, decreases with such a departure.
It follows that at most one rm can have an intermediate cost reduction
level 0 < r < r
max
:
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More formally, let (x) denote the greatest integer smaller than or
equal to the real number x. The requirements that (i)
P
i2M
r
i
= mr
M
,
(ii) at most one r
i
is in the interior of [0; r
max
], and (iii) 0  r
j
 r
max
imply that there is only one solution:
m
0
= 
h
mr
M
r
max
i
; r
j
= r
max
for all j  m
0
r
m
0
+1
= mr
M
 m
0
r
max
; r
h
= 0 for all h  m
0
+ 2 (25)
This concludes the proof.2
So far we have focussed on the two polar cases with ex ante identical
rms, where  is either (strictly) concave, or (strictly) convex. If  is
neither concave nor convex, then it is possible to have two or more levels
of cost reduction that are strictly interior even though rms are initially
identical. See Long and Soubeyran (1995b) for this case.
We now turn to case 3, where rms are ex-ante asymmetric. For sim-
plicity we assume that the function  (r) is strictly concave. Proposition
5 below characterizes the optimal cost reductions. For givem r
M
, let us
dene
 
i
(r
i
) =
1
( P
0
)
[P   c
i
+ r
i
]
2
  
i
(e
i
(r
i
))
 
i
is assumed to be strictly concave. Let y
i
=  
0
i
(r
i
) and y
i
=  
0
i
(r
max
i
):
Without loss of generality, let y
1
 y
2
 :::  y
m
: Assume that at the
optimum all rms strictly reduces their unit cost. Then there will be
two subsets of rms, denoted by M
+
and

M such that all rms j in

M
reduce their cost by the maximum posssible amount, r
max
j
, while all rms
i in M
+
reduce their cost by less than r
max
i
. Clearly, the optimal cost
reductions for all the rms in M
+
must satisfy  
0
i
(r

i
) =  (a constant).
Applying the inverse function of  
0
i
, we have r

i
=  
0 1
i
()  !
i
(): We
dene 
() =
P
i2M
+
!
i
().
Proposition 5: (The ex-ante asymmetric case, with strictly concave
 
i
(r
i
))
If at the optimum all rms reduce their costs then there exists an inte-
ger m
+
 m such that all rms in the set M
+
of indices i = 1; 2; :::;m
+
achieve the cost reduction r

i
= !
i
() and all rms in the set

M =
fm
+
+ 1; :::;mg achieve their respective maximum cost reduction r
max
j
.
The optimal  and m
+
satisfy the following conditions

() = mr
M
 
X
j2

M
r
max
j
; y
m
+
  < y
m
+
+1
Proof: Omitted.
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3 Generalization: Increasing Marginal Costs
We now provide an extension of the results presented in the previous
section to the case of increasing marginal costs. Instead of assuming
that marginal cost is independent of output, we now suppose that rm
i has a mutiplicatively separable cost function
8
C
i
(q
i
; 
i
)  
i
c(q
i
) (26)
where c(0) = 0; c
0
(q
i
) > 0; c
00
(q
i
)  0 and 
i
> 0. The 
i
's are in
turn functions of the amount of resource k
i
used by rm i to reduce its
cost: 
i
= 
i
(k
i
), with 
i
(0) = 
i
> 0, 
0
i
(k
i
) < 0 for 0  k
i


k and

i
 

k

= 
i
> 0: No restriction is placed on 
00
i
(k
i
) : The direct cost to
rm i of procuring the amount of resource k
i
is 
i
(k
i
).
In the second stage of the game, the k
i
's have been chosen. The
Cournot equilibrium in the second stage implies the following conditions
bq
i
c
P
0
+
b
P = 
i
c
0
(bq
i
)  
i
(27)
where the hat over P and q
i
indicate that they are values at the Cournot
equilibrium, and 
i
is the (non-constant) marginal cost (also at the
Cournot equilibrium) of rm i: The second order condition is
bq
i
c
P
00
+ 2
i
c
P
0
  
i
c
00
(bq
i
)  0
Summing (27) over all i
b
Q
c
P
0
+m
b
P =
X
i2M

i
 m
M
(28)
which gives
b
Q =
b
Q(
M
).
From (27),
bq
i
=
b
P   
i
[ 
c
P
0
]
(29)
therefore, at the Cournot equilibrium,

i
=

i
c
0
(bq
i
)
=

i
c
0
h
b
P 
i
( 
c
P
0
)
i
 g
i
(
i
; 
M
) (30)
8
The results of this subsection remain basically unchanged in more general convex
cost formulation. The assumption of multiplicative separability in this subsection
helps simplify the exposition. See Appendix A2 for the general case.
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The equilibrium prot function for rm i in stage two is

i
(
i;

M
) 
"
b
P   
i
( 
c
P
0
)
#
b
P (
b
Q(
M
)) 

i
c
h
b
P 
i
( 
c
P
0
)
i
c
0
h
b
P 
i
( 
c
P
0
)
i
(31)
Invert the function 
i
(k
i
) to obtain k
i
= k
i
(
i
) dened over [
i
; 
i
]
with k
i
(
i
) = 0 and k
0
i
< 0. Firm i 's net prot is

net
M
 
i
(
i;

M
)  
i
(k
i
(
i
)) (32)
where 
i
is given by the third expression in equation (30).
The objective function in stage one is to maximize net joint prots
by choosing the vector  = (
1
; :::; 
m
):
m
net
M

X
i2M

i
(
i;

M
) 
X
i2M

i
(k
i
(g
i
(
i
; 
M
))) (33)
This may be re-written as
m
net
M

X
i2M
 f(
i;

M
) 
X
i2M

i
(k
i
(g
i
(
i
; 
M
))) +
m[
b
P   
M
]
b
P
[ 
c
P
0
]
(34)
where
f(
i
; 
M
) 

i
c
h
b
P 
i
( 
c
P
0
)
i
c
0
h
b
P 
i
( 
c
P
0
)
i
The method of analysis used in Section 2 can be applied to this more
general formulation: First, for a given 
M
, choose the 
i
's to maximize
the objective function subject to
P
i2M

i
= m
M
: The next step is
to choose 
M
. A special case of interest is where c(:) has a constant
elasticity, c
0
(q)q=c(q)   = constant. (Note that  = 1 in the case of
constant marginal costs.)Then
f(
i
; 
M
) =

i
b
P [1  
i
]
[ 
c
P
0
]
(35)
which is convex in 
i
's for given 
M
. This shows clearly that asymmetric
solution can emerge even with increasing marginal costs. In fact using
(35) the gross prot function can be expressed as

M
=
b
P
[ 
c
P
0
]

b
P   
M

1 + 


+

2
M
+ V
M
[ 
c
P
0
]
(36)
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where V
M
is the variance of the distribution of marginal costs, dened as
V
M
 (1=m)
P
i2M
[
i
  
M
]
2
. Note that 1= is a measure of the degree
of increasing return. If it is not a constant, a similar furmula can be
derived, using an `adjusted' variance.
Finally, corollary 2 (the link between industry prot and the Hernd-
ahl index) can be generalized to the non-constant cost case. Let 
i
(q
i
) 
q
i
c
0
(q
i
)=c(q
i
) and let q
M
 (1=m)
P
i2M
q
i
denote the mean output. De-
ne the adjusted mean output by q
a
M
 (1=m)
P
i2M
[q
i
=
i
]. Then we
can show that industry prot in a Cournot equilibrium is related to an
adjusted Herndahl index:
m
M
= m[q
M
  q
a
M
]
b
P + ( 
c
P
0
)
b
Q
2
H
a
M
(37)
where H
a
M
is the adjusted Herndahl index dened by
H
a
M

X
i2M
1

i

bq
i
b
Q

2
4 Applications
In this section we illustrate the usefulness of our approach by apply-
ing it to a number of problems. The models we consider below exhibit
a common theme: an internal allocation problem is solved within an
oligopoly, and the solution often takes the form of the emergence of
an internal market for productive resources. This solution has a col-
lusive eect on the behavior of the rms (or independent divisions of
a multi-divisional rm) that must behave as rivals in the second stage.
The outcome may involve unequal treatment of equals. While we focus
on multi-divisional rms and transfer of productive assets, other obvious
applications suggest themselves: production joint-ventures, subcontract-
ing, internal market for intermediate goods. External input markets can
also be analyzed in a similar fashion. One can think of problems such as
reciprocal access, and access pricing (in telecommunication, for exam-
ple), the establishment of an input-purchasing cartel, and so on.
4.1 Divisionalization and capacity decisions
An interesting question in the industrial organization literature is: what
are the motives for a rm to set up several competing divisions that
produce almost identical products. (See Baye et al.(1996) for some real
world examples.) Several reasons have been oered as possible explana-
tion. Firstly, divisionalization can be a response to the loss of operational
16
control when a rm become too large, see Williamson (1975). Secondly,
a monopolist may use divisionalization as a commitment mechanism for
producing an output level that would prevent entry (see Schwartz and
Thompson (1986), and Veendorp (1991)). Thirdly, given the divisional-
ization decisions of its rivals, an existing oligopolist may have an incen-
tive to divisionalize (see Baye et al. (1996)) in order to increase its prot;
this result is the mirror image of the proposition that mergers that do
not result in monopoly (or near monopoly) are generally not protable,
under the assumption that merging leaves unchanged the production
cost (see Salant et al. (1983)). Here, we add another consideration: if
the capacity decisions by the divisionalized rm is made by the center,
and not by the divisions themselves, should the allocated capacities be
the same for all divisions?
Veendorf (1991) has pointed out that while divisions are allowed to
make their own output decisions, capacity decisions are often made cen-
trally. He showed that centralized capacity decisions can improved the
prot of a divisionalized rm. However, he assumed for simplicity that
all divisions have the same allocated capacity, or capital stock. In this
sub-section, we apply our method developed in Sections 2 and 3 to shed
light on the possible optimality of asymmetric capacity allocation by a
divisionalized rm.
We now describe our model. A monopolist is facing the threat of
entry of a potential rival rm. He must decide whether to accommodate
entry, or to pre-empt it. The game structure is as follows. In stage 1,
the monopolist decides on the number of independent divisions it will set
up. These divisions are instructed to maximize divisional prot, and to
behave as Cournot rivals. In stage 2, the monopolist makes centralized
capacity decision for each division. (Here, we interpret \capacity" not
as an upper limit on output, but as the size of the capital stock, which
aects marginal cost.) In stage 3, the potential entrant chooses whether
to enter or not, and the number of divisions to be set up if it enters; at
this stage it incurs a set-up cost A
e
> 0 per division if the decision is to
enter. In stage four, if there is entry, then the divisions of the entrant
and the divisions of the incumbent compete as Cournot rivals; if there is
no entry, the divisions of the incumbent also compete as Cournot rivals.
We solve the game backwards, and consider stage four rst. Suppose
that entry has taken place in stage 3. Assume for simplicity that the
entrant is a divisionalized rm with n divisions, all with the same capac-
ity, and that each of the entrant's division has a constant marginal cost

e
. The incumbent has m divisions, and the capacity of division i is
k
i
. Let q
i
denotes the output of division i. We assume that the variable
cost of producing q
i
is (k
i
)c(q
i
), where c
0
> 0, and c
00
 0, and a
0
< 0.
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Division i also has incurred (in stage 2) the cost F
i
= A + (k
i
). (The
k
i
's are determined in Stage 2.) Given entry, the Cournot equilibrium
9
in stage four is characterized by (27) for each division i (i = 1; :::;m),
and, for each division j of the entrant,
bq
ej
c
P
0
+
b
P = 
e
(j = 1; :::; n:) (38)
(we assume that the Cournot equilibrium is an interior solution.) Sum-
ming (38) over j and the m equations (27), we obtain an expression
similar to (28):
b
QP
0
(
b
Q) + (m+ n)P (
b
Q) = m
M
+ n
e
This gives
b
Q =
b
Q(m
M
+ n
e
;m+ n). From the denition of 
i
,
bq
i
= c
0 1
(
i
=(k
i
)) = c
0 1
(
i
=
i
) (39)
A conventional way to proceed would be to substitute this into (27) to
get 
i
=
b

i
(
i
;m
M
+ n
e
;m + n). From this, and m
M
=
P


i
, we
would obtain (with a slight abuse of notation) 
i
=
b

i
(;n
e
;m + n),
where  = (
1
; :::; 
m
) and where 
i
stands for (k
i
). Using (29), the
equilibrium net prot of the incumbent's division i in stage four, given
entry, is
b
net
i
=
"
b
P   
i
( 
c
P
0
)
#
P (
b
Q(m
M
+n
e
;m+n)) (k
i
)c
"
b
P   
i
( 
c
P
0
)
#
 (k
i
) A
where 
i
stands for
b

i
(;n
e
;m+n) andm
M
stands for
P
i
b

i
(;n
e
;m+
n). In stage 2, the incumbent divisionalized rm would choose the k
i
's
(i = 1; :::;m).
It is analytically more convenient, however, to use the approach de-
veloped in section 3, and obtain

i
=

i
c
0
(bq
i
)
=

i
c
0
h
b
P 
i
( 
c
P
0
)
i
 g(
i
;m
M
+ n
e
;m+ n) (40)
From this, we proceed to obtain expressions similar to (31)-(34) in sec-
tion 3. For concreteness, let us take the cost function c(q) = (1=")q
"
where "  1, and the demand function P = 1  Q. Then in a Cournot
equilibrium, the equilibrium net prot of the incumbent's division i is
9
We assume that sucient conditions for uniqueness, such as those given in Gaudet
and Salant (1991), or Long and Soubeyran (1999), are met.
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b
net
i
=
b
P bq
i
 
1
"

i
bq
i
  (k
i
(
i
)) A (41)
where 
i
= g(
i
;m
M
+n
e
;m+n), as is given in (40). Using (27), and
P
0
=  1, we re-write (41) as:
b
net
i
=

b
P  

i
"


b
P   
i

  [k
i
(g(
i
;m
M
+ n
e
;m+ n))] A
where
b
P = P (
b
Q(m
M
+ n
e
;m+ n)):
The gross prot (before substracting the set-up cost which has been
incurred in Stage 3) of each division j of the entrant is
b
ej
=

b
P   
e

2
(42)
(using (38) with P
0
=  1.)
In Stage 3, the potential entrant decides whether it should enter, and
if it does enter, how many divisions it will have. No entry means that
n = 0. It follows from (42) that, in Stage 3, the potential entrant will
not enter if
h
P (
b
Q(m
M
+ n
e
;m+ n))  
e
i
2
< A
e
(43)
for all n  1. (It can be shown that if (43) holds for n = 1 then it
also holds for n > 1: an increase in the number of rivalrous divisions
will reduce the net prot of each division, and hence, if each division is
making a negative net prot, the sum of their net prots will fall.
10
).
The potential entrant's decision can be written as n

= n

(;m).
In Stage 2, given that the number of divisions of the incumbent rm
is m, the incumbent decides on the investment allocations across its divi-
sions. This amounts to choosing the 
i
's, taking as given the potential
entrant's decision rule n

= n

(;m), to maximize
m
net
M
=
m
X
i=1
b
i
subject to   
i
 .
In what follows, due to space limitation, we will restrict attention
to the case where parameter values are such that the incumbent nds
it optimal to prevent entry. Then 
M
is chosen to satisfy (43). We
10
If each division is making a positive net prot, an increase in the number of
divisions may increase the sum of their net prots, even though each division's net
prot will fall.
19
then seek to nd out if, at the optimal 
M
, the investment allocation is
asymmetric. An example will suce. Assume the function form
k() =   ;     
and (k) = k,  > 0. Then from (40) 
i
= 
i
=(
b
P   
i
)
" 1
. Thus
m
net
M
=
"
b
P
m
X
i=1
(
b
P   
i
)
#
 
"
1
"
m
X
i=1

i
(
b
P   
i
)
#
 mA  m+
m
X
i=1

i
=(
b
P   
i
)
" 1
(44)
where
b
P = P (Q(m
M
)). If " = 1, then 
i
= 
i
and problem (44) reduces
to maximizing with respect to the 
i
m
net
M
= m(
b
P   2
M
)
b
P  mA  m+ m
M
+
m
X
i=1

2
i
subject to
P
m
i=1

i
= m
M
(given) and   
i
 . Clearly, since m
net
M
is convex and increasing in the 
i
's, the solution of this constrained
maximization problem is a corner one. For example, if m = 2 and 
M
is
such that 2 < 2
M
<  + , then, given 
M
, the optimal pair (
1
; 
2
)
is (; 
M
  ), which is asymmetric.
Similarly, if " = 2, then 
i
= 
i
=(
b
P   
i
): Then the constraint  

i
  is equivalent to

b
P
+ 1
 
i


b
P
+ 1
and again a corner solution is possible if  is small.
Symmetric solutions emerge if the function (k) is suciently convex.
For example, if (k) = k
2
and  is suciently great, then the optimal
solution is symmetric.
A digression: The optimal number of divisions.
As noted above, if (k) is suciently convex, we will have a symmet-
ric solution. In this case, under linear demand, it is relatively simple to
calculate the optimal number of divisions from the point of view of the
incumbent rm.
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4.2 Production Joint Ventures
It is not uncommon for rival rms to jointly own a production joint
venture. For examples, rival gas distributors may own a common gas
pipeline, which reduce their distribution costs. In stage 1, the rms
jointly decide on the total capacity of the pipeline, and the fraction of
the total capacity to be allocated to individual participants. In stage 2,
they are Cournot rivals. We will show that, under certain conditions,
rms that are ex-ante symmetric would nd it protable to be unequal
ex-post.
Let E denote the capacity of the pipeline, and U(E) the total cost
of having that capacity. Let e
i
denote the amount of capacity allocated
to rm i, and E =
P
m
i=1
e
i
. Here we assume that capacity does not
constrain output, but it has a favorable impact on distribution cost:
the greater is the capacity, the lower is the distribution cost per unit.
Consider rst the nal stage of the game, when the decisions on the e
i
's
(and hence on E) have been made. Firm i's distribution cost per unit
of output is given by (1). Assume that rm i must pay a share of the
capacity cost. Its payment is (E)e
i
where (E) = U(E)=E. Firm i's
net prot is

net
i
= Pq
i
  [c
i
  r
i
(e
i
)]q
i
  (E)e
i
Again, we invert r
i
(e
i
) to get e
i
= e
i
(r
i
).
The equilibrium net prot is

net
i

h
P (
b
Q(r
M
))  c
i
+ r
i
i
2
[ P
0
(
b
Q(r
M
))]
  (
m
X
j=1
e
j
(r
j
))e
i
(r
i
)
The sum of the prots is
m
net
M

1
[ P
0
(
b
Q(r
M
))]
k r  x k
2
 (
m
X
j=1
e
j
(r
j
))
2
4
m
X
ij+1
e
j
(r
j
)
3
5
where x is a vector with the typical component x
i
given by (18). In the
rst stage of the games, the rms jointly make the decisions on the r
i
's
to maximize the sum of their prots, given that they will be rivals in
the product market. It is easy to construct numerical examples showing
that the optimal solution involves asymmetric allocation of capacity to
participants of the production joint ventures. (An example is available
from the authors, upon request.)
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4.3 Interrm Transfer of Productive Assets
This section is an attempt to incorporate the idea, advanced by man-
agerial writers, that rms are characterized by collections of resources
that must be developed internally. This is known the resource-based
approach
11
. The resource-based view tends to explain dierences in
performance across rms in terms of access to, and ability to develop
valuable resources that enhance eciency. We sketch below a model in
which rms develop their resources internally with a view of reducing
cost. We then add the observation that rival rms may transfer in-
ternally developed resources among themselves as a means of fostering
collusion
12
.
Consider a Cournot oligopoly consisting of n rms. The rst m rms
are called the insiders, for example, they are independent divisions of a
multi-divisional rms, or aliates of a transnational corporation. The
remaining m

(= n  m) rms are the outsiders. Let M  f1; 2; :::;mg
and M

 fm+1; :::;m+m

g. Firm i's marginal cost is c
i
= c
i
  r
i
(k
i
)
where k
i
is the amount of resources used to reduced production cost.
These resources may be internally trained managers, or scientists. We
assume that r
i
(0) = 0, r
0
i
(k
i
)  0, and r
i
(k
i
)  r
max
i
 c
i
for all k
i
.
In the absence of interrm transfer of resources, each rm would have
to produce its own k
i
, at the cost (k
i
). Dene C 
P
i2M
c
i
 mc
M
,
C


P
j2M

c
j
 m

c
M

, Q 
P
i2M
q
i
and Q


P
j2M

q
j
. Let
P = P (Z); where Z  Q + Q

. A straightforward generalization of
Lemma 1 shows that the equilibrium output is a function of C + C

.
Using an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain

net
M
= e
M
 
1
m
X
i2M

i
(k
i
) (45)
where
e
M
=
V
M
+ [
b
P   c
M
]
2
[ 
c
P
0
]

net
M

=  
1
m

X
i2M


i
(k
i
) (46)
where
e
M

=
V
M

+ [
b
P   c
M

]
2
[ 
c
P
0
]
11
See Foss, Knudsen and Montgomery (1995, pp. 6-8.) for a survey, and the
references listed therein.
12
Our model can also be interpreted as a more general version of the model of
transfer of capital by Farrell and Shapiro (1990a).
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The Herndahl index for group M is
H
M

X
i2M
h
q
i
Z
i
2
=
m
M
[ P
0
]Z
2
(47)
From (47) and (45)
H
M
m
=
V
M
+ [
b
P   c
M
]
2
[ 
c
P
0
]
2
Z
2
=
V
M
+ [
b
P   c
M
]
2
n
2
[
b
P   c
N
]
2
(48)
where c
N
= (C + C

)=n. This shows that, for a given sum of marginal
costs, the combined prot of group M is an increasing function of its
Herndahl index, which is in turn an increasing function of the variance
of marginal costs within the group. It follows that if marginal costs
could be costlessly redistributed within the group without changing the
marginal cost sum C, then rms in group M would have an incentive to
maximize their Herndahl index.
However, since in general the relationship between a rm's stock of
resources k
i
and its marginal cost is not linear, a transfer of resources
will change the marginal cost sum. This will change the equilibrium
industry output and price, at the same time as it changes the variance
of marginal costs. Therefore one cannot conclude that a resource transfer
from a small rm to a large rm is always protable for the groupM . A
convenient way of analyzing this problem is to use the analogue of the
function  (:) of Section 2.
For given r
M

 (1=m

)
P
j2M

r
j
, the rms in group M reallocate
the internally produced resources among themselves to maximize the
sum of their prots. Let v
i
denote rm i's production of the resources,
i 2 M and let v
i
  k
i
denote the net transfer it makes to other rms in
the group. Let k
i
(r
i
) be the inverse of the function r
i
(k
i
). Given any
r
M
 0; consider the set
G(r
M
)  f(r
1
; :::; r
m
) : 0  r
i
 r
max
i
;
X
i2M
r
i
= mr
M
g
For any given r
M
, group M chooses a vector r = (r
1
; :::; r
m
) in G(r
M
)
to maximize the sum of their net prots
m
net
M
=
1
[ 
c
P
0
]
X
i2M
[
b
P   c
i
+ r
i
]
2
 
1
m
X
i2M

i
(v
i
) (49)
subject to
P
i2M
v
i

P
i2M
k
i
(r
i
). The analysis in Section 2 applies to
this problem without any signicant modication.
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5 Further Extensions and Other Applica-
tions
Our framework can also be modied to deal with semi-collusion in models
of Bertrand competition in prices, Hotelling model of location choice,
Salop model of rms located on a circle, and Stackelberg games
13
. It
can be seen from the analysis in the preceding sections (and from the
Appendix) that our formulation applies generally to games where each
player has a pay-o function G
i
(
i
; a
i
;
P
a
j
) where a
i
is agent i's action,
and 
i
is a parameter of manipulation cost. The rst stage of the game
involves solving a sub-convolution problem of the form
max

i
X
i2M
f
i
(
i
; 
M
)
subject to
P
i2M
g
i
(
i
; 
M
)  0, and
P
i2M

i
= m
M
, where 
i
is rm
i's marginal cost. We consider only two examples below.
5.1 Semi-collusion in Bertrand Games
Consider a multidivisional rm that has m independent divisions pro-
ducing dierentiated products. In stage two of the game, the divisions
choose their prices simultaneously. Let p
i
denote division i's price and
p
 i
denote the vector of prices chosen by its opponents. The demand for
division i's output is q
i
= D
i
(p
i
; p
 i
). The total cost of producing q
i
is
C
i
(q
i
; k
i
); where k
i
is the capital stock of division i: Let bp
i
denote rm i's
price at the Bertrand equilibrium, and bq
i
the corresponding quantity.The
following conditions characterize an interior Bertrand equilibrium, which
we assume to be unique:
bp
i
= 
i
+
bq
i
[ D
i
i
]
(50)
where
@D
i
@p
i
 D
i
i
< 0 by assumption, and 
i

@C
i
(bq
i
;k
i
)
@q
i
> 0 Division i's
equilibrium prot is

i
= bp
i
D
i
  C
i
=


i
+
D
i
[ D
i
i
]

D
i
  C
i
=
bq
2
i
[ D
i
i
]
+ (
i
  1)C
i
(51)
where 
i
 q
i

i
=C
i
is the elasticity of the cost function C
i
.
Let the average price be denoted by p
M
= (1=m)
P
i2M
p
i
and assume
that the demand functions take the form
13
See Long and Soubeyran (1997b).
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qi
= d
i
(p
M
)  
i
p
i
(52)
where 
i
> 0; and 0  d
0
i
(p
M
)  
i
, so that if all division increase their
prices by the same amount, then the quantity demanded falls. Then,
from (50) and (52)
bp
i
=
1
2


i
+
1

i
d
i
(bp
M
)

(53)
Summing (53) over all i, we obtain the analog of Lemma 1, that is, the
average price in a Bertrand equilibrium is uniquely determined by the
sum of marginal costs  =
P
i2M

i
and is independent of the distribu-
tion of marginal costs among the divisions:
bp
M
 
X
i2M
d
i
(bp
M
)
2m
i
=

2m
(54)
Thus bp
M
= bp
M
() with bp
0
M
() > 0. Substituting this function into
(52), and using (53), we obtain the equilibrium output for each division:
bq
i
(
i
;) =
1
2
[d
i
(bp
M
())  
i

i
] (55)
Finally, substituting (55) into (51), we obtain the equilibrium prot func-
tion

i
(
i
;) =
[bq
i
(
i
;)]
2

i
+ (
i
  1)C
i
(bq
i
(
i
;); 
i
) (56)
In the rst stage of the game, the multi-divisional rm allocate capital
stocks to the division, so as to maximize overall prot. The two-stage
game with Bertrand competition in the second stage is therefore very
similar to the two-stage Cournot games analyzed in Section 2.
5.2 Semi-collusion in the Hotelling model of location
In thee Hotelling model (see Tirole (1988, pp. 279-281)) with a linear
city, it is assumed that two rms compete in prices in the second stage,
and make their location choice in the rst stage. Consumers are uni-
formly located in the city, and they incur a quadratic transport cost td
2
if d is the distance they must travel to get to good. The two extremes of
the linear city are denoted by 0 and 1. Let a and b be rm 1's and rm
2's location respectively, where 0  a  b  1. Tirole (1988, p. 281)
shows that the Nash equilibrium choice of location exhibits maximal
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distance between the rms. Our approach can be adapted to study the
collusive choice of location in the rst stage of the game. To generalize
the model a bit further, assume that a rm's unit cost depends on its
location, possibly because of proximity to input suppliers etc. It can be
shown that given a and b, the equilibrium prots in stage one are

1
=
1
18t(1  a  b)
ft

(2  b)
2
  (1 + a)
2

  2[c
1
(a)  c
M
(a; b)]g
2
and

2
=
1
18t(1  a  b)
ft

(2  a)
2
  (1 + b)
2

  2[c
2
(1  b)  c
M
(a; b)]g
2
where c
M
is the average of c
1
(a) and c
2
(1  b).
The sum of the two prot expressions is
 =
1
18t(1  a  b)

ht
2
  4t+ 8V
M

(57)
where V
M
is the variance of the costs, as dened by (10), which in this
case depends on a and b, and where
h =

(2  b)
2
  (1 + a)
2

2
+

(2  a)
2
  (1 + b)
2

2
and
 = 4t(c
1
  c
M
)

(2  b)
2
  (1 + a)
2

+4t(c
2
  c
M
)

(2  a)
2
  (1 + b)
2

Suppose, for example, that each rm's cost is a decreasing function of its
distance from the city center (the point 1=2). Then V
M
will be minimized
when a = b = 1=2. Since (57) is increasing in V
M
there is an incentive
for the two rms to agree to be located rather far apart. The precise
solution depends on the specication of the functions c
1
(a) and c
2
(1 b),
and examples can be constructed to show that asymmetric locations are
optimal for this semi-collusion problem.
6 Conclusion
We have provided a framework for analysis of two-stage games of cost
manipulation, where the manipulation involves real resource costs. The
basic model of this paper describes one important aspect of \co-opetition"
within an oligopoly: how rival rms jointly manipulate their costs of pro-
duction, by implicit or explicit cooperation, using real resource, in the
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rst stage of the game. This form of semi-collusion can place (semi)
rival rms in a better position in the second stage, where they are really
rivals. We showed that cost manipulations may give rise to symmetric
or asymmetric outcomes. We characterized the solution, using a global
approach, and show the geometric nature of the solution. We focused on
the constant marginal cost case, but the generalization given in Section
3, for the case of `rankable convex costs', the rst application in Section
4, and the extensions considered in Appendix A2 show that our approach
has a wide range of applications.
The various applications discussed in this paper share a common
characteristic: rms' marginal costs are manipulated by the allocation
and/or production of resources, such as the stock of internally produced
assets (human or non-human), or by using other choice variables such as
location. There are, in general, non-linear tradeos between reduction
of production costs in stage two, and resource costs in stage one. Our
model oers an explanation of the emergence of an internal market within
a multi-divisional rm, or more generally, a group of oligopolists. While
we have focused on the theory of oligopoly, it is clear that our framwork
is applicable to other situations, for example, investment to manipulate
peer pressure and guilt in a social or economic partnership (see Kandel
and Lazear (1992) for an interesting discussion.)
A quite dierent class of cost manipulation, with cost of manipu-
lating, involves the use of taxes and subsidies. It may be thought at
rst that these are pecuniary transfers and thus have no real costs.
Upon reection, however, there is the cost of public nance, because
any subsidy to rms must typically be nanced by taxing consumers in
a distortionary manner. Also, to the extent that some rms are partly
foreign-owned, subsidies are partially `leaked' away from the home coun-
try. The optimal taxation problem in the context of two-stage Cournot
oligopoly games is therefore not trivial. An analysis of this class of cost
manipulation problem is the subject matter of a companion paper, Long
and Soubeyran (1997a).
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Appendices
A.1: Proof of Corollary 1:
From (8) and (7), industry prot is
m
M

X
i2M

i
(c
i
; C) =
X
i2M
( P
0
)q
2
i
(58)
and the Herndahl index is
H
M

X
i2M

q
i
Q

2
=
1
Q
2
X
i2M
q
2
i
(59)
Therefore
m
M
= ( P
0
)Q
2
H
M
(60)
This completes the proof.2
A.2: A unifying treatment of the models of \co-opetition".
The second stage of the various games we considered in the main
text takes the following generic form: Player i 2 N = f1; :::; ng has
the pay-o function G
i
(x
i
; nx
N
; 
i
)where x
N
= (1=n)
P
i2N
x
i
, where
x
i
2 X
i
is the action taken by i and 
i
is a parameter that all the
players jointly manipulate in stage one. Let  = (
1
; :::; 
n
). The
Nash equilibrium (assumed to be unique) in the second stage gives the
equilibrium bx
i
(), i 2 N . Let M be a subset of players that collude in
stage one, even though they will be rivals in stage two. Without loss
of generality, let M = f1; :::;mg. The sum of the stage two equilibrium
payos of members of M is
P
i2M
G
i
(x
i
; nx
N
; 
i
) = m
b
G
M
. (In what
follows we set M = N for simplicity, and consider Cournot games, so
that we identify the action x
i
with the output q
i
; and the parameter 
i
is used to inuence the marginal cost 
i
.)
Let rm i's production cost be C
i
(q
i
; 
i
) where both partial deriva-
tives are positive. Assume C
i
(q
i
; 
i
) is strictly convex in q
i
: Let bq
i
be
the ournot equilibrium output of rm i. Let 
i
denote the marginal cost
at the equilibrium:

i

@C
i
(bq
i
; 
i
)
@q
i
Invert this equation to obtain 
i
= 
i
(bq
i
; 
i
). The industry output in
the Cournot equilibrium in stage 2 is
b
Q = Q(
M
). Then
bq
i
=
b
P   
i
[ 
b
P
0
]
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Much simplicity is achieved by noting that the manipulation of the 
i
s is
equivalent to manipulating the parameters a
i
s, in view of the one-to-one
relationships that must hold at a Cournot equilibrium:

i
=
@C
i
@q
i
(bq
i
; 
i
) =
@C
i
@q
i
 
b
P   
i
[ 
b
P
0
]
; 
i
!
This gives 
i
= 
i
(
i
; 
M
). Firm i's cost function can thus be repre-
sented as
e
C
i
(
i
; 
M
) = C
i
"
b
P   
i
[ 
b
P
0
]
; 
i
(
i
; 
M
)
#
(61)
and its equilibrium prot function is
b
i
(
i
; 
M
) =
b
P   
i
[ 
b
P
0
]
P (
b
Q(
M
)) 
e
C
i
(
i
; 
M
) (62)
The industry gross prot (i.e,. before subtracting the costs of manipu-
lating costs 
i
(
i
; 
M
)) in the Cournot equilibrium is
mb
M
=
b
P   
M
[ 
b
P
0
]
P (
b
Q(
M
)) 
X
i2M
e
C
i
(
i
; 
M
) (63)
Dene
G(
M
) =
b
P   
M
[ 
b
P
0
]
P (
b
Q(
M
)) (64)
From (63) and (64) , it is clear that the rst stage problem has the
following form:
max

i
J =  
X
i2M
f
i
(
i
; 
M
)
subject to
P
i2M

i
= m
M
. (with 
i
 0.) Note that f
i
(
i
; 
M
) stands
for C
i
(
i
; 
M
)  (1=m)G(
M
)+ 
i
(
i
; 
M
). We solve this problem in two
steps.
(i) First we x the mean marginal cost 
M
. It is as if we xed the
nal price of the good, when N = M , which is the case we consider
here.) At this step, we solve the simplied problem:
minS =
X
i2M
f
i
(
i
; 
M
)
subject to
P
i2M

i
= m
M
(with 
i
 0, and 
M
is xed). (It is possible
to include another constraint of the form
P
i2M
g(
i
; 
M
)  0 which
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represents resource constraints on the manipulation of costs; however
we shall omit this for simplicity.) This is a well-known separable non-
linear programming problem, called the inf-convolution problem. Its
resolution uses duality theory via conjugate functions, see Rockafellar
(1970, section 28), Luenberger (1969, Chapter 8). Note that by xing

M
, the nal price of the good is xed, and so is total industry output.
Given this stage two equilibrium, in stage 1 the rivals jointly manipulate
their marginal costs 
i
, i 2 M , to minimize the industry's total cost
of producing the given equilibrium output
b
Q(
M
) (including the cost
of manipulating costs), given that they are rivals in stage two. Let
us describe the inf-convolution approach. We face the standard inf-
convolution problem:
max

i
2M
 
X
i2M
f
i
(
i
; 
M
)
subject to
P
i2M

i
= m
M
, 
i
 0, for a given 
M
. This is where the
mathematical duality theory can be applied, with the use of the concept
of conjugate functions, as described below. Construct the Lagrangian
L =  
X
i2M
f
i
(
i
; 
M
) + 
"
 m
M
+
X
i2M

i
#
Then, making use of the separability property, we obtain
L =
X
i2M
[
i
  f
i
(
i
; 
M
)]  m
M
For an interior solution, the rst order conditions
@f
i
@
i
(
i
; 
M
) =  give

i
=
e

i
(; 
M
). Following Rockafellar (1970), dene the conjugate func-
tion f

i
of f
i
as follows
f

i
(; 
M
) = sup

i
0
[
i
  f
i
(
i
; 
M
)]
Then f

i
(; 
M
) = 
e

i
(; 
M
)  f
i
(
e

i
(; 
M
); 
M
):
Recall that  must satisfy
P
i2M
e

i
(; 
M
) = m
M
, and this equation
gives  =
e
(
M
). (More generally,
e
(
M
) can be obtained from the
saddle-point Lagrangian theorem.)
Next, the optimal 
M
is obtained from solving the problem
max

M
e
L =  
e
(
M
)m
M
+
X
i2M
f

i
(
e
(
M
); 
M
) (65)
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Here, the use of duality, as reected in the conjugate functions f

i
; is
illuminating. The duality saddle-point theorem allows us to dtermine
the optimal 
M
as the solution of
@
e
L
@
M
= 0. From (65), we get
@
e
L
@
M
=  
e
(
M
)m m
M
@
e

@
M
+
X
i2M
"
@f

i
@
e

@
e

@
M
+
@f

i
@
M
#
Using the envelope property that
@f

i
@
e

=
e

i
, we obtain the simplied
condition
@
e
L
@
M
=  
e
(
M
)m+
X
i2M
@f

i
@
M
= 0
where, again due to the envelope theorem,
@f

i
(
e
;
M
)
@
M
=  
@f
i
(
i
;
M
)
@
M
.This
equation determines the optimal 
M
.
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